In Defense of a Little Judiciary: A Textual and Constitutional Foundation for Chevron by McCarrick, Terence J., Jr.






   









    
   
    
 
   
      
MCCARRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 	8/7/2018 10:57 AM 
In Defense of a Little Judiciary: A 
Textual and Constitutional Foundation 
for Chevron
TERENCE J. MCCARRICK, JR.* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................56 

II. CHEVRON: A BRIEF HISTORY......................................................................59 

III. CHEVRON: A TEXTUAL & HISTORICAL BASIS .............................................64 

A.	 The Administrative Procedures Act: A Textual Basis

 for Deference ...................................................................................65 

B. Early Judicial Practice: A Historic Basis for Deference .................66 

1. Ambiguities & Origins of Deference.........................................67 

2. Proto-Chevron: A Practical Foundation for Deference ...........69 

IV. CHEVRON: A CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION .............................................74 

A. Ambiguity, Policy Discretion, & Statutory Interpretation ...............76 

B. Executive Power ..............................................................................81 

V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................85 

*	 © 2017 Terence J. McCarrick, Jr.  Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, 
D.C. The views expressed herein are the author’s own and not those of Kirkland & Ellis
LLP or its clients.  Many thanks to Michael R. Dillon, William Doolittle, Emily Merki,
Gregory K. Frizzell, Mary Grupp, Jeff Johnson, Britney Lewis, Eloise Pasachoff, Steven
Patton, John Prendergast, Barrett Powers, Matthew Razzano, and Sarah Smith for their 
valuable comments and conversation.  Thanks also to editors of the San Diego Law Review for 
their careful work throughout the editing process. This Article is dedicated to Michael R.
Dillon: a finer professor and mentor there has never been. 
 55
    
 
 








    
 
   
 





   
 
  
   
    
    
   
  
  
    
 










      
    
MCCARRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:57 AM 
I. INTRODUCTION
The bedrock of modern administrative law faces a mutiny.  For decades,
the Chevron doctrine required federal courts to defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers.1 
Chevron was premised on the across-the-board presumption that Congress 
delegates enforcement discretion to agencies when it legislates ambiguously,
and that agencies—rather than courts—properly resolve statutory ambiguities
in the course of policy administration.2  In other words, Chevron championed
the role of the political branches in creating and executing law.3 
That consensus is under siege. Courts began by chipping away at the 
background presumption of delegation.4  But increasingly, judges have 
declared open season on Chevron writ large, arguing it upsets the proper 
balance of power between the branches of government.5 This trend is notable,
1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840, 844, 866 (1984); see
also City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (“Statutory ambiguities will be 
resolved, within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but by the
administering agency.”).
2. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296 (“Chevron is rooted in a background 
presumption . . . ‘that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute’ administered by
an agency, ‘understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the 
agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of
discretion the ambiguity allows.’” (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735,
740–41 (1996))); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 980 (2005) (“In Chevron, this Court held that ambiguities in statutes within an
agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the
statutory gap in reasonable fashion.”); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Chevron sets forth an across-the-board presumption, which operates as
a background rule of law against which Congress legislates: Ambiguity means Congress
intended agency discretion.”).
3. See, e.g., City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296, 307; Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980
(“Filling [statutory] gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped
to make than courts.” (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66)).
4. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (declining to apply– 
Chevron deference to certain issues of “economic and political significance” (quoting Util. 
Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014))); Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. at 231–34 (establishing framework for deciding whether Chevron applies to an 
ambiguity at all).
5. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“In an appropriate case, this Court should reconsider that fiction of
Chevron and its progeny.”); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions.”);
Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurring) (“An
Article III renaissance is emerging against the judicial abdication performed in Chevron’s 
name.”); Egan v. Del. River Port. Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., 
concurring) (“Chevron . . . and [its] like are . . . contrary to the roles assigned to the
separate branches of government . . . .”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 
1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron pretty clearly involves 
neither . . . [the] executive functions [of fact-finding or detail specification] and . . . appears
56
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not for its critique of centralized power in bureaucracies—that’s old hat— 
but for its implicit embrace of judicial supremacy.6  Indeed, nearly every 
skeptic of Chevron genuflects at the altar of Marbury, trumpeting the 
judiciary’s power to “say what the law is.”7  That is a fitting response for 
jurists laboring to throw off the yoke of a decision long considered the
“counter-Marbury for the administrative state.”8  But does the critique 
have any purchase?
In a word, no.  Textualist and originalist critiques of administrative deference 
largely rest on the following rationales: (1) Chevron flatly contradicts the
plain text of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which empowers 
courts—not agencies—to interpret statutory provisions;9 and (2) Chevron
violates the separation of powers as originally understood.  To be sure, 
these criticisms invoke Marbury, general separation-of-powers principles 
in The Federalist, commentary by pre-founding political thinkers, and the
text of the Constitution and APA.10  But largely absent is discussion of 
instead to qualify as a violation of the separation of powers.”); Hicks v. Colvin, No. 16­
154, 2016 WL 7436050, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 21, 2016) (“For good reason, jurists have
begun to ask whether [the Chevron] state of affairs violates the separation of powers.”). 
6. See, e.g., City of Arlington, 596 U.S. at 304 (“Make no mistake—the ultimate 
target here is Chevron itself. . . .  The effect would be to transfer any number of interpretive 
decisions—archetypal Chevron questions, about how best to construe an ambiguous term 
in light of competing policy interests—from the agencies that administer the statutes to
federal courts.”); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 822 (1989) (“Chevron’s rule . . . is simply a sound recognition that a
political branch, the executive, has a greater claim to make policy choices than the 
judiciary.” (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843)).
7. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); accord Michigan, 135 
S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring); Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 539 (Brown, J., 
concurring) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177); Egan, 851 F.3d at 278 (Jordan,
J., concurring) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d
at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
8. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 
(1986) (“Affording deference to an agency’s legal analysis, however, seems facially
contrary to the fundamental principle . . . that ‘it is emphatically the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.’” (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177)); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 
2580, 2589 (2006) (“Chevron is properly understood as a kind of counter-Marbury for the
administrative state.”).
9. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when
presented, the reviewing court shall . . . interpret constitutional and statutory provisions . . . .”).
10. See Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 
126 YALE L.J. 908, 926–27 (2016) (noting that recent critics of Chevron “cite[ ] Chief 
Justice Marshall’s directive in Marbury that courts must ‘say what the law is’; the text of
the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and III; James Madison’s and Alexander Hamilton’s
 57
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founding-era cases concerning deference to executive interpretation of 
ambiguous statutes.11  And the scholarship that does exist is all over the map12 
—both supporters and opponents of Chevron claim history is on their side.13 
This “wide spectrum of historical interpretation . . . suggests that the roots”
of the Chevron doctrine “remain poorly understood.”14 
This Article hopes to help fill that “important gap in the administrative 
law literature.”15  And it proceeds in three parts.  Part II offers a brief history
of the Chevron doctrine and its discontents. It traces the doctrine’s origin 
and scope and ends by articulating the textualist and originalist critique of
Chevron described above. Part III grapples with that criticism and offers 
a textualist and originalist defense of Chevron. Section III.A describes the 
textual footing for Chevron in the APA and argues that Chevron—if not 
commanded by the APA—does not upset the role it envisions for courts. 
Section III.B describes the approach of founding-era courts to administrative
deference and suggests that they establish a proto-Chevron consensus.  
Part IV is more ambitious—it articulates a separation-of-powers basis for
administrative deference.  Section IV.A explains that courts in the early
Republic recognized the President’s Article II authority to exercise policymaking
discretion conferred by law.  And exercises of that discretion were generally
held unreviewable by courts.  Section IV.B argues that the original public 
meaning of Article II supports Chevron, drawing on early-American and
pre-founding English political theory.  Make no mistake: I come to praise 
Chevron, not to bury it.16 
statements on the importance of the separation of powers in The Federalist; similar general 
statements by Montesquieu, William Blackstone, and other pre-Founding authors; and the text
of section 706 of the APA” (footnotes omitted)). 
11. See id. at 927 (“[T]hough Chevron was premised on a jurisprudential tradition,
that tradition plays no part in the current debate.”); see also id. at 918 (noting “[t]he
lacuna in the scholarship on the roots and historical development of judicial deference”). 
12. See id. at 913–14 (collecting historical accounts of the jurisprudential basis for
Chevron).
13. Compare United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that, historically, “[j]udicial control of federal officers was primarily
exercised through the prerogative writ of mandamus,” which “would not issue unless the 
executive officer was acting plainly beyond the scope of his authority”), with Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the “paltry
efforts” to understand  the constitutional origins of deference and arguing that Chevron is 
inconsistent with separation of powers as originally understood). See generally Bamzai,
supra note 10, at 912–14 (discussing different historical accounts of deference). 
14. Bamzai, supra note 10, at 914. 
15. Id. at 929. 
16. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 (“I
come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.”). 
58
    
 
    
 


























   






    
  
MCCARRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:57 AM 
[VOL. 55:  55, 2018] In Defense of a Little Judiciary 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
II. CHEVRON: A BRIEF HISTORY
Chevron established a “now-canonical” framework for reviewing an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers.17  To start, a court uses 
“traditional tools of statutory construction” to determine “whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”18  If congressional 
intent is clear, “that is the end of the matter”—both the court and the agency
“must give effect” to the manifest will of the legislature.19  But “if [a] statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue, the question for
[a] court is whether the agency’s [interpretation] is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”20 That result flows necessarily from an agency’s
power to formulate policy and “‘fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly,
by Congress.’”21 
Chevron’s framework “provides a stable background rule” that “[s]tatutory 
ambiguities will be resolved,” within reasonable bounds, “not by the courts 
but by [an] administering agency.”22  In other words, an agency’s construction 
of an ambiguous statute is not to be set aside unless “arbitrary, capricious, 
or manifestly contrary” to congressional will.23  In this way, Chevron offers
agencies flexibility to pursue different—and yes, opposite—policy goals than
their predecessors.24  Put differently, it prevents ossification of federal 
law.25 
As a matter of scope, Chevron’s rule applies across the board—to big, 
jurisdictional matters, as well “humdrum, run-of-the-mill” minutiae.26 Any
distinction between those categories is “a mirage”;27 a semantic difference
without a limiting principle.28  In every case, “[n]o matter how it is framed,”
17. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 
v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 843 n.9. 
19. Id. at 842–43. 
20. Id. at 843. 
21. Id. (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
22. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296. 
23. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
24. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining that, under Chevron, ambiguities “create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of
continuing agency discretion” and that Chevron leaves matters of discretion “within the
control of the Executive Branch for the future”).
25. See id.
 26. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 297. 
27. Id.
 28. Id. at 300 (“[E]very new application of a broad statutory term can be reframed
as a questionable extension of the agency’s jurisdiction.”).
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the question facing a court reviewing agency action is whether an agency
strayed beyond its authority.29  All Chevron inquiries collapse into whether 
an agency’s action was ultra vires.30 
Moreover, efforts to rein in Chevron are fraught with risk.  Aside from
line-drawing problems, sorting agency action into substantial, insubstantial, 
jurisdictional, and non-jurisdictional buckets would “transfer any number 
of interpretive decisions . . . about how best to construe an ambiguous
[statute] in light of competing policy interests” from executive agencies 
to federal courts.31  It would also invite chaos, replacing Chevron’s
blanket presumption with an ad hoc, totality-of-the-circumstances test that
would replicate the incoherence of pre-Chevron case law.32  Perhaps most 
importantly, the Chevron framework also reinforces separation-of-powers
norms.  Though rules and adjudications “take ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ 
forms,” agency action in a zone of ambiguity is an exercise of executive
power.33  But only such power as the legislature confers.  “Congress knows 
how to speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious 
terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency discretion.”34  And when it comes 
to regulation, courts should not do for Congress what Congress can do for 
itself.35 
That has not stopped courts from trying.  Over the years, and for different 
reasons, not everyone has bought in to the Chevron consensus.  The first
wave of judicial skepticism began by questioning whether ambiguity
necessarily implies delegation to executive agencies.36 Chevron’s blanket
presumption was supplemented with a statute-by-statute analysis of whether 
“Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law.”37  So, judges “tailor deference to variety”38—rules made
 29. Id. at 297. 
30. See id. (“Both their power to act and how they are to act is authoritatively
prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly, no less than when they act beyond 
their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires.”); see also id. at 301 (“[T]he question in
every case is, simply, whether the statutory text forecloses the agency’s assertion of
authority, or not.”). 
31. Id. at 304. 
32. See id. at 307 (noting that determining whether a “particular issue” was committed
to agency discretion under a totality of the circumstances would “render the binding effect
of agency rules unpredictable and destroy the whole stabilizing purpose of Chevron” (emphasis 
omitted)); see also United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a statute-by-statute, totality-of-the-circumstances approach “is a recipe
for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation”). 
33. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 304 n.4.
 34. Id. at 296. 
35. See id.
 36. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231–38 (2001). 
37. Id. at 226–27. 
38. Id. at 236. 
60
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pursuant to formal, notice-and-comment procedures, by a centralized group 
of decisionmakers, with binding force of law receive deference; rules that 
do not are “beyond the Chevron pale.”39  An exception was also made for 
questions of “deep ‘economic and political significance’ . . . central to [a] 
statutory scheme.”40 
Certainly, these decisions undermine Chevron, replacing its blanket
presumption with a patchwork of caveats.  But at least they honored Chevron
in the breach.41  Reframed, each caveat offers an account of agency action 
that lacks the force of law or exceeds the reasonable discretion conferred
by Congress: in United States v. Mead Corp., tariff classifications “churned
out at a rate of 10,000 a year at [the Custom Service’s] 46 . . . offices” could 
not reasonably be considered the “authoritative” position of the agency;42 
in King v. Burwell, Congress spoke directly—albeit clumsily—to the
availability of tax credits for insurance purchased on federal exchanges;43 
consequently, the IRS lacked any discretion to deviate from that mandate;44 
in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the EPA’s application of the 
Clean Air Act exceeded statutory authorization to issue permits for “a 
relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy procedural 
and substantive burdens”;45 and in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., the FDA lacked authority to regulate the tobacco industry under
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, especially in light of Congress’s
 39. Id. at 227, 234 (explaining that delegation may be evidenced by an “agency’s 
power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking”); see also id. at 228– 
34 (describing factors considered in affording deference). 
40. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory
Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)) (declining to apply Chevron to tax
credits available on federally-created healthcare exchanges); cf. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444
(declining to apply motor vehicle emissions standards to stationary sources and explaining 
that courts skeptically review newfound claims of “unheralded power” over a substantial 
portion of the American economy discovered in a “long-extant statute”); FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 147 (2000) (holding that Congress did not
delegate authority to the FDA to regulate tobacco).
41. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 242–47 (2006) 
(recasting Chevron Step Zero decisions as Step One decisions).
42. 533 U.S. at 233–34 (2001); see also Sunstein, supra note 41, at 230–31 (noting
the “pragmatic” difficulty of deferring to numerous letter-rulings issued by “lower-level 
functionaries”).
43.  135 S. Ct. at 2489–96. 
44. Id. at 2489 (declining to apply Chevron and noting that “[t]his is not a case for 
the IRS”).
45.  134 S. Ct. at 2442–44. 
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subsequent tobacco-specific legislation.46  Framed in this way, each “limitation” 
of Chevron actually reinforces and applies its framework by asking whether an
agency’s action was ultra vires.47  Importantly, none of those decisions
challenges Chevron’s statutory or constitutional basis. 
Not so for new critiques, which address Chevron head-on. Believing
regulation has run amok in the hands of power-hungry bureaucrats, some
in the judiciary now seek to starve the administrative state of its perceived
lifeblood—the Chevron doctrine.48  The lines of attack are generally twofold:
(1) Chevron flouts the plain text of the APA, which vests courts—not
agencies—with power over statutory interpretation;49 and (2) Chevron
warps the original understanding of separation of powers.50  The consequence— 
according to Chevron’s discontents—is a textual and constitutional distortion
that concentrates vast governing power in the administrative state. 
As to the APA, some have noted Chevron’s apparent inconsistency with
5 U.S.C. § 706, which provides “[t]o the extent necessary to decision and 
when presented, [a] reviewing court shall . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions.”51 
At a glance, this provision seems to contemplate very different interpretive
roles for courts and agencies than Chevron.  Indeed, interpretive rules are
exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures 
altogether52 on the theory that such rules—“as merely interpretations of 
46. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131–61 (2000);
Sunstein, supra note 41, at 247 (arguing that Brown & Williamson is “best read as [a] Step One
decision[ ]”). 
47. Indeed, UARG and Brown & Williamson apply Chevron expressly. See UARG, 134 
S. Ct. at 2439 (“We review [the] EPA’s interpretations of the Clean Air Act using the 
standard set forth in Chevron.” (citation omitted)); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132
(“Because this case involves an administrative agency’s construction of a statute that it
administers, our analysis is governed Chevron.” (citation omitted)).
48. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(expressing alarm that the EPA “felt sufficiently emboldened by . . . precedent[ ] to make
the bid for deference that it did”); Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 280–81 
(3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring) (“Deference to agencies . . . tends to the permanent 
expansion of the administrative state. . . .  Agencies can make the ground rules and change 
them in the middle of the game.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1157 (10th
Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting that Chevron emboldens administrative agencies
“in their capacity and willingness to interpret statutes aggressively”). 
49. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Heedless of the original design of the APA, we have developed an elaborate law
of deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes and regulations.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 
834 F.3d at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[I]n the APA[,] Congress expressly vested the
courts with the responsibility to ‘interpret statutory provisions’ and overturn agency action
inconsistent with those interpretations.” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012))). 
50. See cases cited supra note 5.
51.  5 U.S.C. § 706. 
52. Id. § 553(b)(A) (“Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this
subsection does not apply . . . to interpretive rules . . . .”).
62
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statutory provisions”—are subject to plenary judicial review.53  On this 
view, the APA puts the lie to Chevron’s underlying presumption: that
Congress impliedly delegated authority to agencies, rather than courts, to 
construe statutory ambiguities.54  Put differently, “Chevron’s claim about 
legislative intentions is no more than a fiction—and one that requires a
pretty hefty suspension of disbelief at that.”55 
As to separation of powers, some argue that, under Chevron, agencies 
usurp legislative and judicial authority. With respect to legislative power,
“[the] whole point” of Chevron is the delegation of authority to the executive 
branch.56  And within bounds, that is appropriate.57  But if Chevron allows
policy volte-faces on matters concerning jurisdiction or “huge swaths” of
the economy, to what extent can it really be faithful to the “substantial
guidance” required by the nondelegation doctrine?58 Chevron, then, not
only “diminishes the role of Congress,”59 but “runs headlong into the teeth”
of Article I’s Vesting clause.60  And it neuters an already modest nondelegation
doctrine61 by allowing agencies to pursue whatever policy goals they wish 
“without any particular fidelity” to statutory text.62  With respect to judicial 
power, Chevron robs the judiciary of its power to “say what the law is.”63
 53. S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 18 (2d sess. 1946). 
54. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[I]n the 
APA Congress expressly vested courts with the responsibility to ‘interpret statutory provisions’ 
and overturn agency action inconsistent with those interpretations.  Meanwhile not a word can 
be found here about delegating legislative authority to agencies.” (citation omitted) (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 706)). 
55. Id.
 56. Id. at 1154; see Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 279 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Jordan, J., concurring). 
57. See J.W. Hapton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which [a] person or
body . . . is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.”).  An extended discussion of the nondelegation doctrine is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  I leave for future work analysis on the scope and impact of that 
doctrine on deference. 
58. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1154–55 (Gorsuch, J. concurring). 
59. Egan, 851 F.3d at 279 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
60.  Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
61. See id. (explaining that precedent “bring[s] into bold relief the scope of the 
potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to countenance in the name of Chevron
deference”). 
62. Id.
 63. Id. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); accord Egan, 851 F.3d at 278 (Jordan, J., concurring) (quoting
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177); Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 539 (D.C. 
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By allowing the executive to resolve statutory ambiguities, “Chevron seems
no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”64 
It pushes judges “further and further away” from their constitutional
responsibility of checking the political branches65 and precludes them
from exercising independent judgment.66  In sum, Chevron concentrates
almost all government power in the administrative state.  And by vesting 
agencies with authority to create, interpret, and enforce the law,67 individual 
liberty is placed at risk.68 
III. CHEVRON: A TEXTUAL & HISTORICAL BASIS
Or so the critique goes.  Part II offered an account of the emerging “Article 
III renaissance” against Chevron.69  Part III offers a textual and historical 
riposte. Section III.A analyzes the APA and concludes that Chevron—if 
not expressly permitted by § 706—does not usurp the interpretive role
it prescribes for courts.  Indeed, even where granting deference, courts do
interpret statutes to identify ambiguities and assess the reasonableness of 
an agency’s construction.  Section III.B chronicles the approach of founding
and antebellum-era courts towards administrative deference, and argues it 
foreshadows the Chevron consensus. In this way, Part III offers a more 
rigorous discussion of administrative deference than the judicial criticisms
set out above, none of which offer extended engagement with the text of
the APA or early judicial practice.
Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177); Gutierrez-
Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at
177).
64. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
65. Egan, 851 F.3d at 279 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
66. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Assn., 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015)); see Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective
in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the 
Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 75–81 (2000). 
67. See Egan, 851 F.3d at 280 (Jordan, J., concurring) (“When the power to create
and interpret and enforce the law is vested in a single branch of government, the risk of
arbitrary conduct is high and individual liberty is in jeopardy.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 
F.3d at 1155 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Under its terms, an administrative agency may
set and revise policy (legislative), override adverse judicial determinations (judicial), and 
exercise enforcement discretion (executive).”).
68. See Egan, 851 F.3d at 280 (Jordan, J., concurring) (explaining that Chevron’s 
violation of the separation of powers, by permitting arbitrary and shifting agency action,
threatens individual liberty); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(describing notice and equal protection concerns raised by Chevron).
69. Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., 
concurring). 
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A. The Administrative Procedures Act: A Textual Basis for Deference
The APA commands courts to interpret statutes.70 But it is far from
clear that judges abdicate that duty in Chevron’s name. Under Chevron, 
courts determine de novo the existence or non-existence of a statutory
ambiguity. And even then, an agency’s interpretation cannot exceed the
bounds of the reasonable. Courts applying Chevron, therefore, do engage 
in statutory interpretation.71  And nothing in the APA requires more.  To
the contrary, APA standards of review lend support to Chevron’s framework. 
Under § 706, courts must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . 
found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law . . . [or] in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, 
or limitations, or short of statutory right.”72 That is Chevron with the steps
reversed.73 
None of this is to say the APA commands Chevron.  After all, § 706
establishes multiple, seemingly conflicting standards of review.74  But it 
does suggest that critics of Chevron overstate their case. By its plain terms 
“[n]othing” in the APA “affects other limitations on judicial review.”75 
And the standards of review provided in the APA do not even apply to “agency
action . . .  committed to agency discretion by law.”76  “[J]udicial review [was]
conferred only to correct ‘an abuse of discretion granted by law.’”77 Within
 70. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
71. John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
457, 459 (2014) (“[T]he reviewing court fulfills its duty to ‘interpret’ the statute by determining 
whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its assigned discretion—that is, 
whether the agency has construed its organic act reasonably.”). 
72.  5 U.S.C. § 706. 
73. See Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency 
Discretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1, 32–46 (2011) (recasting Chevron in terms of standards of judicial review provided for in §
706).
74. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by
law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of 
this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the 
reviewing court.”). 
75. Id. § 702. 
76. Id. § 701. 
77. S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 36 (2d Sess. 1946). 
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that zone of discretion, the APA expressly contemplated that agencies
would “determine not merely whether they have power but whether and 
why, upon the facts, their discretion should be exercised.”78 
The drafters of the APA understood that Congress—not courts—would 
be the branch responsible for reining in that discretion.  Legislative history 
confirms that “[t]he expansion of . . . administrative discretion [would] be
remedied, if at all, by the more precise statement of the statutory definitions 
and directions or limitations in legislation conferring administrative powers.”79 
In any case, whatever their relationship, the standards provided in § 706 
simply codified longstanding judicial practice.80  That is, they “restat[ed]
the present law as to the scope of judicial review” in terms of “general . . . 
principles.”81  If one of those principles was deference to executive interpretations 
of ambiguous statutes, Chevron can hardly be considered an abdication of
judicial responsibility.  And the precursor to the APA—the Report from the 
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure—suggests
deference was part and parcel of judicial review.  It noted, “where [a] statute
is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court may
accept that of the administrative body . . . as the opinion of the body especially 
familiar with the problems dealt with by the statute and burdened with the
duty of enforcing it.”82  If that rule of deference stems from the separation 
of powers, Chevron may even have a constitutional pedigree. 
B. Early Judicial Practice: A Historic Basis for Deference
Section II.A identified a textual foothold for Chevron in the APA. Section 
II.B argues Chevron is consistent with early judicial practice.  Section II.B.1 
discusses founding-era and antebellum caselaw involving deference to
executive interpretations of statute. It also describes and rejects efforts to
recast these cases as inconsistent with Chevron. Section II.B.2 discusses the 
practical foundations of deference, and argues the framework employed by
early courts codified a proto-Chevron doctrine. 
78. Id. at 34. 
79. Id. at 40. 
80. See id. at 39 (explaining that the APA “seeks merely to restate the several
categories of questions of law subject to judicial review . . . repeated by courts in the course of
judicial decisions or opinions”). 
81. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 93, 108 (1947). 
82. S. REP. NO. 77-8, at 90–91 (1st Sess. 1941). 
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1. Ambiguities & Origins of Deference 
The framers well understood the problem of statutory ambiguity. In
fact, Federalist No. 37 recognized it as inevitable.83  Writing as Publius, 
James Madison observed that “[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest 
technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are 
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal.”84  Imprecision is the
natural consequence of “the complexity of objects” regulated and the medium 
of legislation—the written word.85  And “no language is so copious as to 
supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include 
many equivocally denoting different ideas.”86  Linguistic inaccuracy, then,
“must be greater or less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects
defined.”87  Meaning is “liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular
discussions and adjudications.”88 
At the founding, discussions and adjudications featured deference to 
executive interpretations of statutes.  As early as 1827, the Supreme Court 
recognized that “[i]n the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, 
the contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act 
under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled 
to very great respect.”89  In subsequent years, that principle was affirmed 
again and again.90  But what, exactly, was the basis for deference?
Some suggest temporal proximity and unbroken executive practice account
for judicial deference to departmental interpretations.91  That is the position 
taken by the most in-depth scholarly treatment of Chevron from an originalist 
83. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 182–83 (James Madison) (Yale Univ. Press ed.,
2009).
84. Id. at 182. 
85. Id. at 182–83; see also id. at 183 (“Here, then, are three sources of vague and
incorrect definitions: indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception, 
inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.  Any one of these must produce a certain degree of 
obscurity.”). 
86. Id. at 183. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 182. 
89.  Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827). 
90. See, e.g., Hahn v. United States, 107 U.S. 402, 406 (1882); Hedden v. Iselin, 
31 F. 266, 268 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); Graham v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 83, 91 (1883); 
Hahn v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 305, 318 (1878). 
91. See Bamzai, supra note 10, at 943–47 (arguing that deference to longstanding, 
contemporaneous constructions was a canon of construction in the early Republic). 
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perspective.92 And there is case law to that effect.93  A contemporaneous
construction by the executive sheds light on a statute’s likely meaning— 
actions taken immediately after the passage of a law often reflect or speak
to the problems a statute was designed to address.  But that is not inconsistent 
with Chevron. On that account, executive practice sheds light on statutory
meaning at Chevron Step One, and often constitutes a reasonable exercise 
of discretion at Chevron Step Two.  And cases refusing to grant deference are
not to the contrary: some involved statutory language plainly contradicting 
an executive construction;94 others involved impairments to vested rights— 
in other words, quasi-retroactive applications of an interpretation;95 others 
92. See id.
 93. See, e.g., Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U.S. 542, 552 (1890) (declining to grant
deference to Treasury Department practice which was not “uniform,” and noting “a 
construction of a statute by a department charged with its execution [is not] held
conclusive and binding upon the courts of the country, unless such construction has been 
continuously in force for a long time”); Hahn, 107 U.S. at 404–05 (“The findings in this
case show . . . that such distribution was made in accordance with the uniform practice of 
the Treasury Department . . . .”); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 762 (1877) (“It has 
always heretofore obtained in the Navy Department.”); Hedden, 31 F. at 268 (“The plaintiff in
error relies upon the construction of the law adopted by the treasury department . . .
consistently adhered to by that department ever since the act . . . went into effect.”); see
also Bamzai, supra note 10, at 44–47 (discussing cases).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Healy, 160 U.S. 136, 145–49 (1895) (declining to
grant deference to non-uniform executive practice, but noting that “[i]f any doubt could 
exist as to the object of section six . . . that doubt must be removed by the explicit language 
of added section seven”); City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 461 (1879) (“Were the meaning
of the act doubtful, which cannot be admitted, the rule is universal that the contemporaneous 
construction of such a statute is entitled to great respect.” (emphasis added)); Moore, 95
U.S. at 763 (“The difficulty has arisen from [the parties] not having been careful to harmonize 
the language of the sections.  Hence the seeming conflict.  But the intention of Congress 
is clear, and that intention constitutes the law.”); Hedden, 31 F. at 268 (“There is no ambiguity, 
and no room for difference of opinion, as to the meaning of the language of section 2930, 
nor has there been since the act of 1842.”); Graham, 18 Ct. Cl. at 92–93 (“The law on 
which the appellee bases his claim is plain and unambiguous.  We must give it its natural 
and obvious meaning, and thus interpreted it leaves the appellant no ground to stand on.”
(quoting United States v. Temple, 105 U.S. 97, 99 (1881))). 
95. See, e.g., United States v. Ala. Great S. R.R., 142 U.S. 615, 621 (1892) (“It is 
especially objectionable that a construction of a statute favorable to the individual citizen
should be changed in such manner as to become retroactive, and to require from him the 
repayment of moneys to which he had supposed himself entitled, and upon the expectation 
of which he had made his contracts with the government.”); United States v. Hill, 120 U.S. 
169, 182 (1887) (“[A] court seeking to administer justice would long hesitate before 
permitting the United States to go back, and not only as against the clerk; but as against
the surety on his bond, reopen what had been settled with such abundant and formal
sanction.”); City of Panama, 101 U.S. at 461 (noting that deference to longstanding practice is
appropriate where “a different interpretation would impair vested rights”); United States
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 37 F. 551, 556 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889) (“[R]eliance upon the stability
of title evidenced by patents from the government . . . should not be disturbed in the case 
at bar.”).
68
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still counseled judicial acquiescence to longstanding, uniform executive 
practice.96  But none flatly contradict Chevron. 
That is unsurprising.  At a fundamental level, the contemporary construction 
account does not explain why executive interpretations received deference, 
as opposed to merely persuasive force.97  After all, courts seem equally well 
disposed to construe statutes contemporaneously.  So, the ambiguity that 
triggered deference must have carried different implications for the executive 
than the judiciary.  Executive constructions controlled “only . . . where the 
language of [a] law [wa]s ambiguous.”98  And that was the consequence of 
the executive’s constitutional responsibility to enforce statutes: “[t]he officers
concerned are usually able men, and masters of the subject.  Not unfrequently 
they are the draftsmen of the laws they are afterwards called upon to interpret.”99 
As a result, “the construction given to a statute by those charged with the
duty of executing it [was] . . . entitled to the most respectful consideration,
and [would] not be overruled without cogent reasons.”100  Section II.B.2
explores the practical basis for that rule. 
2. Proto-Chevron: A Practical Foundation for Deference 
As today, statutes in the early Republic contained ambiguities and silences. 
And in them lurked questions about the relationship between legislation,
96. See, e.g., Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U.S. 542, 552 (1890) (“There is no such long 
and uninterrupted acquiescence in a regulation of a department, or departmental 
construction of a statute, as will bring the case within the rule . . . that in case of a doubtful
and ambiguous law the contemporaneous construction of those who have been called upon
to carry it into effect is entitled to great respect, and should not be disregarded without the 
most cogent and persuasive reasons.”); United States v. Philbrick, 120 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1887)
(“[T]he power of the Secretary to establish rules and regulations for the apportionment of
the sums set apart by Congress . . . having been frequently exercised prior to 1835, without 
objection by the legislative branch of the government; and since that act, as well as the one
of 1866, is an implied recognition of the practice established in the Navy Department prior 
to 1835, we are not disposed, at this late day, to question the validity of the order of May
23, 1866.”). 
97. See Hedden, 31 F. at 268 (giving “controlling” weight); Graham, 18 Ct. Cl. at 93
(granting “determining” effect).
98. Hedden, 31 F. at 268; see also Graham, 18 Ct. Cl. at 93 (“The rule which gives 
determining weight to contemporaneous construction put upon a statute, by those charged 
with its execution, applies only in cases of ambiguity and doubt.”).
99. Moore, 95 U.S. at 763; accord Bowen v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 162, 173–74 (1878) 
(quoting Moore, 95 U.S. at 763). 
100. Moore, 95 U.S. at 763; accord Bowen, 14 Ct. Cl. at 173 (quoting Moore, 95 U.S. at
763). 
 69





   









   
   
      
      
  
   





     
 
 













MCCARRICK (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:57 AM 
regulation, and executive enforcement.  Judges passed on such questions
regularly, but in a more modern fashion than you might expect.101  In fact,
courts openly recognized that “attempt[ing] to regulate, by law, the minute 
movements of every part of the complicated machinery of government”
was “a most unpardonable ignorance.”102 Even in the 1800s, there were
“numberless things [to] be done, that c[ould] neither be anticipated nor defined,” 
which were “essential to the proper action of the government.”103  As a result, 
courts acknowledged that prescription by prolix was neither practical nor 
desirable.104 
Regulations filled the gap.  As originally understood, Congress marked out 
the broad outlines of the law.105  But, “of necessity, usages [were] established 
in every department of government” that “regulate[d] the rights and duties 
of those” in their charge.106  In crafting rules, departmental and agency heads
were “often compelled to exercise . . . discretion.”107  And though limited by
law, an administering official was not required to “show [a] statutory provision
for everything he d[id].”108  In this way, departmental regulations comprised
“a kind of common law,” which could change with the political headwinds.109 
In fact, courts expressly noted the mutability of regulatory interpretations.110 
Of course, “no change of . . . usages c[ould] have a retrospective effect.”111 
Nevertheless, an agency head had “the same power as another, to give
a construction to an act which relates to the business of the department.”112 
An application of these principles is found in United States v. Macdaniel. 
In Macdaniel, the United States sued an ex-naval clerk for wrongfully
collecting commissions on pensions disbursed in the course of his duties.113 
The dispute centered on an 1804 statute, which authorized the President
 101. See, e.g., Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1850); Gratiot v. United 
States, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 336 (1841); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840);
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); United States v.
Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1 (1833); United States v. Webster, 28 F. Cas. 509 (D. Me. 
1840) (No. 16,658); United States v. Cadwalader, 25 F. Cas. 231 (E.D. Pa. 1835) (No. 
14,706); United States v. Duval, 25 F. Cas. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 15,015). 
102. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 14; accord Webster, 28 F. Cas. at 515. 
103. Id. at 14–15.
 104. See id.
 105. See id. at 14 (noting that “the great outlines of [the law’s] movements may be 
marked out”).
106. Id. at 14–15. 
107. Id. at 14. 
108. Id.
 109. Id. at 15. 
110. See id. at 14 (“It will not be contended that one secretary has not the same power 
as another, to give a construction to an act which relates to the business of the department.”). 
111. Id. at 15. 
112. Id. at 14. 
113. Id. at 10–11. 
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to “attach to the [Washington] navy yard . . . a captain . . . who shall have 
the general care and superintendence of the same, and shall perform the
duties of agent to the navy department.”114 
Before 1829—when Macdaniel was removed from office—the Secretary 
of the Navy interpreted the statute to allow the appointment of an agent, 
separate from the navy yard commandant, to administer servicemember
and privateer pension funds.115  Under that construction, Macdaniel collected
a one percent commission on disbursements for a period of fifteen years.116 
In 1829, however, the Secretary changed course.117  As reinterpreted, the 1804 
statute permitted only the commander to perform agent-related duties.118 
To that end, the Secretary argued that Macdaniel’s appointment and payment 
was unsupported by law.119 
The Supreme Court disagreed.120 But in doing so, it sustained the validity
of both interpretations of the 1804 statute. To start, the absence of a statutory 
authorization for a disbursement agent did not render Macdaniel’s appointment 
ultra vires.121  To the contrary, the court explained that the practical realities
of government precluded Congress from legislating every detail of the 
statutory scheme.122 Consequently, the Secretary’s action—appointing 
a disbursement agent—was reasonable given the inherent demands of 
administering a pension fund.123  But it was equally reasonable for the 
114. Id. at 12. 
115. Id. at 12–14. 
116. Id. at 14 (“The defendant having acted as agent for navy disbursements for a 
great number of years, under different secretaries, and having uniformly received one per
cent, on the sums paid, as his compensation, he continues to discharge the duties and receive 
the compensation, until a new head of the department gives a different construction of the
act of 1804, by which these duties are transferred to the commandant of the navy yard.”);
see also id. at 11, 16. 
117. See id. at 13. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 14 (“It is insisted, that as there was no law which authorized the appointment 
of the defendant, his services can constitute no legal claim for compensation . . . .”).
120. See id. at 16–17. 
121. Id. at 15 (“It must be admitted, that there was no law authorizing the appointment of
the defendant, nor was it considered necessary that there should be a special statutory
provision on the subject.”); see also id. at 14 (explaining that although an agency head “is 
limited in the exercise of his powers by the law . . . it does not follow that he must show 
statutory provision for everything he does”). 
122. See id. at 14. 
123. See id. at 15–17 (“For the convenience of the officers of the navy and others 
who were engaged in the service of the department, certain disbursements became 
necessary; and as no law specially authorized the appointment of an agent for this purpose, 
 71
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Secretary to conclude that the 1804 statute vested administrative duties in 
the commandant alone.124  Thus, Macdaniel prevailed, not because the 
post-1829 interpretation was unreasonable, but because the government 
tried to apply it retroactively.125  The court noted that Macdaniel made
disbursements over a period of fifteen years “under different secretaries 
of the navy . . . at the same rate of compensation.”126 That charge “was
sanctioned by the accounting officers of the treasury department” without 
any objection from Congress.127  So, while the Secretary’s revised interpretation 
of the statute could have prospective effect, the government could not— 
after changing course—claw back payments for services already rendered.128 
Another application of proto-Chevron principles is seen in United States
v. Webster.  There, the United States sued an army officer for charging
commissions on disbursements made in the course of his duties as 
quartermaster during the Seminole Wars.129 In disallowing the commissions, 
the Department of the Treasury relied on an 1833 Army regulation that
expressly prohibited “additional compensation” for officers disbursing 
funds at the direction of the War Department where such compensation
“[was] not specially provided by law.”130  That regulation altered prior practice,
whereby the War Department allowed extra compensation.131 
The district court sided with the government,132 and noted the parties’ 
agreement that Army regulations—“prescribed by the [W]ar [D]epartment” 
and sanctioned by the President—carry “the force of law.”133  By “force of 
law,” the court did not mean regulations could “control or annul an act of 
the legislature”; executive practices carried legal force only “when . . .
consistent with the laws established by” Congress.134  But consistency did 
they were required to be made by a clerk. . . .  [This court] think[s] that the secretary of
the navy, in authorizing the defendant to make the disbursements, on which the claim for 
compensation is founded, did not transcend those powers which, under the circumstances 
of the case, he might well exercise.”).
124. See id. at 13–14. 
125. See id. at 14 (“By this new construction, whether right or wrong, no injustice is 
done to the defendant, provided he shall be paid for services rendered under the former 
construction of the same act.  But such compensation has been refused him.”). 
detail the cases in which extra compensation had been formerly allowed, and which [was] . . .
 126. Id. at 16. 
127. Id.
 128. See id. at 14. 
129. 
130. 
 United States v. Webster, 28 F. Cas. 509, 510 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 16,658). 
Id. at 516–17. 
131. See id. at 517 (describing an 1835 Army regulation “which enumerate[d] in 
disallowed for the future”).
132. See id. (“The regulation of 1833 was in force when these disbursements were 
made; and it expressly denies any allowance . . . .”).
133. Id. at 515. 
134. Id.
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not require express permission.135  Though “[t]he great outlines of [an 
official’s] powers and duties may [have] be[en] fixed . . . there [was] a wide
field of detail and contingencies, which no human sagacity c[ould] foresee, 
and which, of  course, [could not] be provided for by general laws.”136 
Implementation details were “necessarily left to the judgment and discretion 
of those who ha[d] the immediate superintendence of the service,” provided
they operated within the bounds of a statute’s “landmarks.”137 
As a consequence, “customs and usages bec[a]me established which 
constitute[d] a sort of common law of the service” the “highest evidence” 
of which were “printed and promulgated [regulations].”138  Regulations
comprised “a sort of complement of the statute-law upon the subject” and 
“affect[ed] the rights and obligations of those who [were] subject to them.”139 
While in effect, such regulations were “binding.”140  But as the name implies,
customary law could be “abrogated by the establishment of a contrary custom”
by the “same authority” that prescribed an initial usage.141  In every case, 
however, customs were required to conform to “the will of the legislature,
expressed in the public laws.”142 
To be clear, the executive’s role in regulation made a difference.  Judges 
recognized that the executive—with its “immediate direction and
superintendence” of departments and agencies—“ha[d] the best means 
of judging when” and how to reconcile competing policy interests in
ambiguous statutes.143  Even in the absence of a legislative command or 
established custom, “the decision of an executive department, confirmed
by the president, if not absolutely conclusive, deserve[d] to be very gravely 
considered, before [being] overruled by [a] court.”144  That stemmed from 
135. See id. at 515–16 (“[A]lthough no such order can be valid, when it is repugnant 
to an act of [C]ongress, a great many orders, in matters of detail, may be, and are, issued
which are not inconsistent with the general law, although not expressly authorized by it.”).
136. Id. at 515; see also id. (“[I]t is quite impossible that any statute should go into 
all the details of regulation required to maintain the police and discipline of the army, and
still more so, that it should anticipate and provide for all the exigencies demanded for the 
prompt and effective action of the military force, amidst the vicissitudes and casualties 
occurring to an army, engaged in the active duties of a campaign.”).
137. Id. at 515–16. 
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the “unavoidabl[e]” discretion conferred on executive officials by statutory 
ambiguity and silence.145  It bears repeating that “legislation . . . can never 
go into all the minute detail[s] of regulation,” which consequently “are left
to the regulation of the department” charged with implementing a statute.146 
* * * 
Founding-era administrative law, then, bears a striking resemblance to
the Chevron consensus. Distilled, both affirm the following principles:
Congress cannot, and should not, legislate every detail of a regulatory
regime; as a result, open implementation questions pass to the executive, 
including agencies, for completion; to that end, administering officials
may proscribe needful and appropriate regulations, even where not expressly 
provided for; such regulations must be reasonably consistent with the will
of Congress; however, regulations may change, albeit without retroactive 
effect; and in any case, Congress may expressly limit the executive’s
exercise of discretion and enforcement as it sees fit.147 
IV. CHEVRON: A CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION
The foregoing establishes Chevron’s distinguished practical pedigree. 
But so what? Federal courts do not sit to philosophize about the most 
pragmatic form of government; they sit to interpret statutes and the Constitution
as written.148  And to weather the Marbury critique—that judges abdicate 
their constitutional duty in Chevron’s name—Chevron better be made of 
sterner stuff than the “legal fiction” most suppose it to be.149  Yet, even
proponents of Chevron squirm at the suggestion that deference might be 
145. See id. at 515–16. 
146. Id. at 517. 
147. Compare United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 13–17 (1833), and Webster, 
28 F. Cas. at 515–17, with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 833–45 (1984). 
148. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The 
judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the 
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”), 395 
(“The courts must declare the sense of the law . . . .”).
149. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (“In the vast majority of cases I expect that Congress 
neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but
rather (3) didn’t think about the matter at all.  If I am correct in that, then any rule adopted in
this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a 
background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.”); Silberman, supra note 6,
at 822 (“Congress is presumed to delegate, to the Executive, authority to make those choices
within certain bounds.”). 
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constitutionally compelled.150  By their lights, Congress could textually
“rebut Chevron’s presumption . . . by stripping the agency of deference” or 
“reverse [it] generically by amending” the APA.151 
I am not so sure.  Congress certainly tries—when legislating—to say
what it means and mean what it says.152  But that only begs the question;
statutory text does not magically become clear at Congress’s say-so.  More
fundamentally, any law that would prevent a judicial finding of ambiguity—
or attendant deference to the executive—looks a lot like a decision rule 
that raises separation-of-powers concerns all its own.153  Nothing in the
Constitution suggests that the legislature may sit as the “judge[ ] of [its] 
own powers” or make “the construction they put upon them . . . conclusive [
]on the other departments.”154  And the same goes for the executive.  That
observation brings Chevron’s constitutional foundation into view: Chevron
is not about interpretation qua interpretation; it is about deference to
presidential policy decisions within the scope of delegated authority. 
Section III.A situates such deference within Article II.  It argues that
interpretation of ambiguous statutes is an exercise in policy discretion
allowed by law.  Under the political question doctrine, that discretion was 
historically unreviewable and received substantial deference from courts.
Section III.B discusses the original public meaning of “executive power.”
It concludes that Anglo-American political theory supports a robust view 
of presidential power, encompassing discretionary action to carry laws
into execution. 
150. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 149, at 515–16 (rejecting separation-of-powers basis for
Chevron); Silberman, supra note 6, at 824 (“Chevron is [not] in any sense constitutionally
dictated by the separation of powers.”). 
151. Silberman, supra note 6, at 824. 
152. See, e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]ourts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says there.”); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 53, 68 (1810) (“Men use a language 
calculated to express the idea they mean to convey.”).
153. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) (“Can [Congress]
prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus 
conferred, because and only because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be
adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor? This question seems to us to answer 
itself.  The rule prescribed is also liable to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon,
and thus infringing the constitutional power of the Executive.”).
154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 83, at 393 (Alexander Hamilton).
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A. Ambiguity, Policy Discretion, & Statutory Interpretation 
Courts defer to the executive, not because of a superior interpretive
capacity, but because of a superior policymaking capacity.155  And it is
policy discretion that is offered in spaces of ambiguity.  In the administration 
of duties imposed by Congress, “[t]he head of an executive department . . . is
continually required to exercise judgment and discretion.”156  To that end,
agency heads “must . . . expound[ ] the laws and resolutions of Congress,
under which” they act.157  In taking such action, agency officials partake
in the “political duties imposed upon . . . the executive department [by the 
Constitution], the discharge of which is under the direction of the President.”158 
In other words, when agency officials exercise discretion, they also exercise 
“executive power” “beyond the reach of any other department.”159 
Of course, not all actions are unreviewable.  “Ministerial” duties involve 
no delegation of discretion and “are not [subject] to the direction
of the President.”160 Lawsuits involving ministerial acts, therefore, do not
“interfere[ ]  . . . with the rights or duties of the executive.”161  The discretionary-
ministerial distinction has deep roots in American jurisprudence.162  And 
it has been developed primarily in writ of mandamus cases.
On one side of line, fall cases like Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes. 
There, the Supreme Court confronted a statute requiring the postmaster
general to credit relators with the full amount of any award rendered by a
solicitor statutorily empowered to settle and adjust contract claims against 
the government.163  The court held the duty to credit to be “ministerial”— 
the postmaster general was “vested with no discretion or control over the 
decisions of the solicitor,” but rather was “simply [required] to credit the 
relators with the full amount” owed.164  As a result, the suit did not “involve[ ]
any conflict between the executive and judicial” branches: enforcing the 
performance of a mere ministerial act did not endeavor “to direct or control
 155. See Silberman, supra note 6, at 822 (“Chevron’s rule . . . is simply a sound recognition
that a political branch, the executive, has a greater claim to make policy choices than the
judiciary.” (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))). 
156.  Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840). 
157. Id.
158. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838), rev’d 
sub nom. Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845). 
159. Id. (“The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are
derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in
the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power.”). 
160. Id.
 161. Id.
 162. See, e.g., Decatur, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 497; Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 524; 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
163. See Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 608–09, 613–14. 
164. Id. at 611, 613. 
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the . . . discharge of any official duty, partaking in any respect of an executive
character.”165 
On the other side of the line, fall cases like Decatur v. Paulding. In Decatur, 
the Supreme Court considered a claimant’s entitlement to spousal pension 
benefits in addition to a pension already specially awarded her by Congress.166 
After successive Secretaries of the Navy denied her benefits claims,
Decatur moved for mandamus to compel payment, which was ultimately
denied by the D.C. Circuit.167  Affirming the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme 
Court rearticulated Kendall’s “distinction . . . between a mere ministerial
act, required to be done . . . and a duty imposed upon [the head of an executive 
department] in his official character . . . in which judgment and discretion
are to be exercised.”168 
Denial of pension benefits—and statutory interpretation by the executive 
to that end—qualified as discretionary.  Indeed, the court found all of the 
following actions involved some measure of discretion: the initial denial
of Decatur’s claim; reconsideration of that decision; statutory interpretation
concerning entitlement to benefits; determinations of the amount owed, if 
any; and evaluation of pension fund’s financial condition.169  On review
of those actions, the judiciary “had no right . . . to control [the executive’s]
judgment[ ] and guide him in the exercise of a discretion which the law
had confided to him.”170  Judicial “interference . . . with the performance
of the ordinary duties of the executive . . . would be productive of nothing
but mischief” and would raise serious separation of powers concerns.171 
Revived, the discretionary-ministerial distinction offers a constitutional 
basis for Chevron deference.  That is to say, it supports the claim that agency
officials interpreting ambiguous statutes exercise executive power under
Article II.172  Of course, not all agree. Some argue the discretionary-ministerial
 165. Id. at 610. 
166. 
167. 
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 513–14.
Id. at 514. 
168. 
169. 
Id. at 516–17 (citing Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 614). 
Id. at 515. 
170. Id. at 517. 
171. Id. at 516. 
172. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.”); id. § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed . . . .”); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 499 (1866)
(contrasting ministerial duties with “the duty of the President in the exercise of the power 
to see that the laws are faithfully executed”). See generally Jack Goldsmith & John F. 
Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280 (2006). 
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distinction stems from the form of relief requested.173  In other words, the
nature of mandamus review put the rabbit in the hat, so to speak, in favor 
of the executive’s preferred construction.174 
As a descriptive matter, that is wrong.  Courts also applied the distinction
to cases involving injunctive relief.175  And in specifically rejecting a
mandamus-based account of deference, they noted that the nature of
injunctive relief did not “take the case out of the general principles which 
forbid judicial interference with the exercise of [e]xecutive discretion.”176 
Whatever the relief sought, “an officer to whom public duties are confided
by law[] is not subject to the control of the courts in the exercise of the 
judgment and discretion which the law reposes in him as part of his official 
functions.”177  Put differently, where “powers and duties are confided” in 
executive officials, “there exists no power in the courts, by any . . . process[],
to act upon the officer so as to interfere with the exercise of that judgment.”178 
As a normative matter, the mandamus account of deference is unpersuasive. 
Critics point out that Decatur qualified its rule of deference with the 
following proviso: 
If a suit should come . . . which involved the construction of any of these laws, 
the Court certainly would not be bound to adopt the construction given by the 
head of a department.  And if they supposed his decision to be wrong, they would, 
of course, so pronounce their judgment.179 
That is true, as far as it goes.  But it isn’t very far. After that passage,
Decatur reiterated that courts “could not . . . revise [an agency head’s] judgment
in any case where the law authorized him to exercise discretion” or “guide 
and control his judgment . . . in the matters committed to his care.”180  And 
any judicial pronouncement could “be given [only] in a case in which
[courts] have jurisdiction . . . to ascertain the rights of the parties in the
cause before them.”181
 173. See Bamzai, supra note 10, at 959 (arguing that the nature of mandamus review 
dictated deference to executive interpretations (quoting Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken 
Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856))). 
174. See id.
 175. See, e.g., Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347, 352 (1868) (rejecting the 
suggestion “that the relief sought . . . was through the writ of mandamus, and that the decisions 
are based upon the special principles applicable to the use of that writ”); Johnson, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) at 499.
176. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 499; accord Gaines, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 353.
177. Gaines, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 352.
178. Id.
179. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840); see also Bamzai, supra
note 10, at 952 (discussing Decatur).
180. Decatur, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 515. 
181. Id.
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Thus, Decatur makes clear that deference was the product not of the 
relief requested, but of the nature of the right at issue.  And here is where
things get interesting: Marbury supports that view. In fact, Marbury originated
the discretion-ministerial distinction that provides deference with its
constitutional pedigree.182  Many forget that Marbury began by questioning
judicial authority to review executive action, formulating what became
known as the political question doctrine.183  It explained, “whether the
legality of an act of the head of a department be examinable” in court “always 
depend[s] on the nature of th[e] act.”184  Actions pursuant “to constitutional 
or legal discretion” or made as a “political or confidential agent[ ] of the 
executive” were only “politically examinable.”185  That is because, in such
cases, officials act “merely to execute the will of the President.”186  “[W]here 
a specific duty is assigned by law,” in contrast, and “individual rights depend 
upon the performance of that duty,” judicial recourse is appropriate.187 
Marbury, then, envisions a modest role for federal courts reviewing
executive actions.  Federal courts sit “to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have [] discretion.”188  So, political questions—or questions
by law “submitted to the executive[‘s]” discretion—are nonjusticiable.189 
Best read, that threshold determination of justiciability was the “jurisdiction” 
referenced in Decatur. In fact, Marbury expressly described the political
question doctrine as jurisdictional.190  In any event, both Marbury and Decatur
acknowledge that where a department head “acts in a case, in which
executive discretion is to be exercised . . . any application to a court to control,
in any respect, his conduct, [sh]ould be rejected without hesitation.”191
 182. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 158, 166–67 (1803). 
183. See id. at 163 (“It behoves us then to enquire whether there be . . . any ingredient 
which shall exempt [the case] from legal investigation, or exclude the injured party from
legal redress.”), 170 (“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”). 
a jurisdiction.  An extravagance, so absurd and excessive, could not have been entertained 
184. Id. at 165. 
185. Id. at 166. 
186. Id.
 187. Id.
 188. Id. at 170. 
189. Id.
 190. See id. (“It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to such
for a moment.”).
191. Id. at 170–71; see Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840). 
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In discussing political questions, Marbury placed a premium on Article 
II authority, as manifest in presidential and departmental decisions.  It
explained that the Constitution vests the executive “with certain important
political powers,” the exercise of which requires “use of his own discretion.”192 
“To aid . . . in the performance of these duties,” the President “appoint[s]
certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his
orders.”193  In exercising discretion under law, “their acts are his acts” and 
the judiciary retains “no power to control” them.194  In this way, Article II
authority—including discretion conferred by law—inheres in department
and agency officials vis-à-vis their relationship with the executive.  And 
the example given by the Marbury court confirms this fact. Remarking 
on the relationship between the President and executive officials, the court
identified the statute creating the Department of State.195 
These constitutional interests also reflect practical realities of governance. 
Marbury remarked that “[t]he intimate political relation . . . between the 
[P]resident . . . and the heads of departments . . . necessarily renders any legal 
investigation of the acts of” department heads “irksome as well as delicate.”196 
And “intrud[ing] into the cabinet . . . to intermeddle with the prerogatives 
of the executive” risks entangling courts in policy administration.197  Indeed, if
all “contested [agency] business . . . [is] drawn from the officers to whom 
the law” confides such matters into the courts, judges “will find themselves 
converted into superintendents” of the day-to-day administration of
government.198  The discretionary-ministerial distinction guards against 
such a distortion of constitutional roles.
* * * 
This discussion suggests that Chevron’s critics both over-read and under- 
read Marbury. They over-read it by suggesting the power to “say what 
the law is” includes resolving competing policy choices offered in cases
of ambiguity; they under-read it by ignoring its formulation of the political 
question doctrine, which provides for non-reviewability of discretionary
decisions by executive officials.  In fact, Marbury and its progeny—in 
articulating the discretionary-ministerial distinction—provide a constitutional
 192. 
193. 
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–66. 
Id. at 166. 
194. Id. 
195. See id. (“[B]eing entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is
conclusive.  The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of congress 
establishing the department of foreign affairs.”). 
196. Id. at 169. 
197. Id. at 170. 
198.  Litchfield v. Register, 15 F. Cas. 592, 595 (D. Iowa 1868) (No. 8,388). 
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basis for Chevron deference.  Put simply, when an agency exercises policy
discretion in the space of a statutory ambiguity, that action qualifies as an
exercise of Article II power entitled to respect from the courts. 
B. Executive Power
The original meaning of “executive power” confirms this reading.  Article
II vests “executive power” in a single magistrate—the President of the
United States.199  Originally understood, that power extended to day-to­
day administration of government, in other words, “operations of the body
politic.”200  From a presidential perspective, administration required specification 
of “details” which fell “peculiarly within the province of the executive 
department”—to wit, conduct of foreign relations, “preparatory plans of 
finance,” “application and disbursement” of public monies, superintendence
of the armed forces, and “other matters of a like nature.”201  Of course, 
“immediate management” was not directly carried out by the President, 
but by “assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate”202 who share in 
Article II power.203  Thus, by its plain terms, the Constitution expressly 
contemplates a role for agencies and departments in steering the ship of state.204 
And that ship’s course was expected to change from administration to 
administration.205
 199. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 83, at 347– 
48 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested 
in a single magistrate.”). 
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
200. 
201. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, supra note 83, at 365 (Alexander Hamilton). 
Id.
 202. Id.
 203. See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 5, 1787), in 
(hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS) (“A principal reason for unity in the Executive was that
officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.”). 
204. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] may require the opinion, in 
writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject
relating to the duties of their respective offices . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 
83, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he principal departments of the administration under 
the present government, are the same which will be required under the new.  There are 
now a Secretary of War, a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a Secretary for Domestic Affairs, 
a Board of Treasury . . . . These officers are indispensable under any system, and will suffice
under the new as well as the old.”). 
205. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, supra note 83, at 365 (Alexander Hamilton) (“To 
reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a successor
as the best proof he can give of his own capacity . . . and in addition to this propensity, 
where the alteration has been the result of public choice, the person substituted is warranted in
 81
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The founders understood that carrying laws into execution required 
discretion, which, in turn, often called for statutory interpretation.  Indeed, 
on the floor of the Constitutional Convention, James Madison remarked
that the chief difference between the executive and judiciary was not with 
respect to interpretation; “[t]he [executive] expounded [and] applied [laws]
for certain purposes, as the [judiciary] did for others.”206  Rather, the
difference consisted in the “much greater latitude” afforded the “opinion 
and discretion” of the executive in discharging his office.207 It was understood
that other executive officials would assist with this task, without whom 
the President “c[ould] do nothing of consequence.”208 
This view of executive power had deep roots in the Anglo-American
tradition.  In 1689, John Locke recognized that “the good of society requires . . .
several things [] be left to the discretion of him that has the executive
power.”209  The law cannot address everything, and legislators, try as they
might, cannot “foresee and provide . . . [for] all that may be useful to the 
community.”210  As a result, certain details “must necessarily be left to the
discretion of” the chief magistrate,211 which encompasses “a latitude . . . to 
do many things . . . the laws do not [expressly] prescribe.”212  To be sure, the
legislature may “resume [execution of the laws] out of [executive] hands, 
when they find cause” as in the case of “maladministration.”213  But the
supposing that the dismission of his predecessor has proceeded from a dislike to his
measures . . . .”).
206. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 203, at 34. 
207. Id.
208. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 19, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 203, at 54; see also id. (noting Gouverneur Morris’s 
observation that “[t]here must be certain great officers of State; a minister of finance, of
war, of foreign affairs &c . . . [who] will exercise their functions in subordination to the 
Executive”); James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 21, 1787), in 
2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 203, at 80 (recounting John Rutledge’s statement that 
“[t]he Executive could advise with the officers of State, as of war, finance &c. and avail 
himself of their information and opinions”); James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional 
Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 203, at 139 (noting Charles 
Pinkney’s observation that “the heads of the principal departm[ents] . . . could be called
on by the Executive Magistrate whenever he pleased to consult them”). 
209. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 159, at 91 (Thomas P. 
Peardon ed., 1952). 
provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make laws that 
210. Id.
 211. Id.
 212. Id. § 160, at 92; see also id. (“[I]t is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to 
will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour . . . .”).
213. Id. § 153, at 86; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . 
[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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nature of executive power requires it “be always in being”214 to carry into 
effect laws that remain in force.215  Subordinate officials exist to aid in
that task, and derive their authority from the “supreme” executive power.216 
This understanding was also shared by Sir William Blackstone.  To start,
he affirmed the power of executive prerogative—that is, “the discretionary
power of acting for the public good, where the positive laws are silent.”217 
Of course, such power was not “absolute” and was subject to exceptions 
and boundaries set out by law.218  But in many cases, discretion was granted 
by statute with prerogative delegated to the King’s Privy Council, composed 
of the British equivalent of department heads.219  That arrangement did
not usurp legislative power.  Although lawmaking was “entirely the work 
of . . . the legislative branch,” the “manner, time, and circumstances of 
putting those laws in execution [was] frequently left to the discretion of the 
executive magistrate.”220  Consequently, edicts concerning implementation— 
called proclamations in England—“[we]re binding” so long as “they d[id]
not either contradict the old laws or tend to establish new ones.”221 
In contrast, judges play no part in the policymaking process. As a
structural matter, the executive and judiciary are separate institutions, 
with no power granted for judicial consultation on policy matters.222 
Speaking against a judicial presence in the cabinet, Elbridge Gerry noted, 
“[i]t was quite foreign from the nature of [the] office to make [courts] judges 
214. LOCKE, supra note 209, § 153, at 86. 
215. Id. § 144, at 82 (“[B]ecause the laws, that are at once and in a short time made
have a constant and lasting force and need a perpetual execution or an attendance thereunto;
therefore, it is necessary there should be a power always in being which should see to the 
execution of that laws that are made and remain in force.”).
216. Id. § 151, at 85 (explaining that the chief magistrate “has in him the supreme 
execution from whom all inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers”). 
217. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *251–52. 
218. Id. at *250 (“[T]he constitution hath expressly, or by evident consequence, laid
down some exception or boundary; declaring that thus far the prerogative shall go, and no 
further.”).
219. See id. at *260–65; see also id. at *237 n.1 (“In modern times, in practice, the 
exercise of many branches of the king’s prerogative is from time to time delegated by statute to
the privy council, as the granting licenses, &c; and acts are passed regulating foreign and 
domestic concerns, weights, measures, &c.”).
of judging . . . joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence 
220. Id. at *270. 
221. Id. 
222. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 83, at 247 (James Madison) (“Were the power 
of an oppressor.”). 
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of the policy of public measures”;223 such a role would “mak[e] Statesmen 
of [] Judges.”224  Nathaniel Gorham agreed, explaining that “Judges [] are not 
to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of
public measures.”225 
This conception provides a robust role for executive power.226  But that 
is not inevitable. Technically, Congress could specify every manner of 
detail in promulgating a statutory scheme; however, that was not the 
constitutional design.  The framers opposed “making the [e]xecutive the 
mere creature of the [l]egislature,”227 and recognized “[i]t [wa]s one thing
to be subordinate to the laws, but another to be dependent on” Congress.228 
And as a practical matter, “no statute [truly] can prescribe every implemental 
detail.”229  As a result, the executive necessarily exercises discretion in 
prescribing details required to carry a legislative program into effect.230 
Otherwise, the President is nothing more than a “messenger-boy,” without
even the power “to preserve legislative programs from destruction so that 
Congress will have something left to act upon.”231 
The growth of government, therefore, has predictably expanded agency 
power.  And far from a deviation, the framers anticipated this result as flowing 
from the constitutional design.  James Madison wrote that the consequence
of “extend[ing] federal powers to every subject falling within the idea of
the ‘general welfare’ . . . must be to enlarge the sphere of discretion allotted 
to the executive magistrate.”232  As government grows, “[t]he difficulty of
providing uniform and particular regulations . . . [would] be increased.”233 
And as a result, “a greater latitude [would be afforded] to the agency of that
department which is always in existence, and which could best mould [sic] 
regulations . . . so as to suit them to the diversity of particular situations.”234 
223. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 4, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 203, at 97–98. 
224. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 203, at 75. 
225. Id. at 73. 
226. For a modern discussion of this view of executive power, see Goldsmith & Manning,
supra note 172. 
227. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 2, 1787), in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 203, at 86 (quoting George Mason). 
228. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 83, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton). 
229.  Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 172, at 2308. 
230. See id. at 2303. 
231. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 708–09
(1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
232. JAMES MADISON, VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800, at 201 (Richmond, J.W. Randolph
1850).
233. Id. at 201–02. 
234. Id. at 202. 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
V. CONCLUSION
This Article set out to offer a textual and originalist defense of Chevron 
deference. But it does not condone the excesses of the administrative 
state. Critics of Chevron—and of bureaucracy more generally—are rightly
concerned with centralization of power in administrative agencies.  Their
criticism, however, misses the mark.  The text of the APA is far from clear, 
and certainly does not prohibit deference to agencies.  And founding-era 
judicial practice cuts in Chevron’s favor.  Early courts routinely deferred
to executive statutory interpretations on the understanding that laws 
require exercises of discretion for implementation, which, in turn, qualify
as an exertion of executive power under Article II.  In short, Chevron has
a remarkable practical and constitutional pedigree. 
So, what—if not Chevron—accounts for the continued expansion of the 
administrative state?  Conscious political choice.  Congress and the President 
ensure bureaucratic growth in their passage and implementation of laws. 
And voters, not courts, must hold them accountable.  Eliminating deference 
only elevates judges.  That begets smaller government, but only of a kind— 
the unelected, life-tenured variety.235  Indeed, in the post-Chevron world, 
judges would likely replace the political choices of indirectly accountable
agency officials with their own.  Ambiguities would confront courts with 
a Rorschach test; what judges see would say a great deal more about their 
political preferences than congressional intent or statutory meaning. 
None of this is to say that courts have no role in policing agency action. 
They do.  But only in rigorously enforcing plain meaning at Chevron Step 
One, and undertaking a meaningful reasonableness inquiry at Chevron
Step Two.236  That sort of application preserves respect for executive discretion 
without entirely foreclosing judicial review.  And, by getting judges out
 235. See Silberman, supra note 6, at 823 (“The agencies—even the independent ones— 
have superior political standing to the life-tenured federal judiciary in performing [a] 
policymaking function.”).
236. See Scalia, supra note 149, at 521 (“[T]here is a fairly close correlation between
the degree to which a person is . . . a ‘strict constructionist’ of statutes, and the degree to which
that person favors Chevron and is willing to give it broad scope.  The reason is obvious.  One 
who finds more often . . . that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from 
its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for 
Chevron deference exists.  It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require [a textualist] 
to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, [he or she] would not personally
adopt.”). 
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 237. Silberman, supra note 6, at 822. 
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